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‘Think abstractly? Sauve qui peut!’1 If there’s one thing we have all learnt from the legacy of 
German Idealism – particularly its Hegelian ‘culmination’ – it is the poverty of the abstract. 
The ‘reproach of abstraction’2 is one with which we are comfortable, for ‘the abstract 
universal… is an isolated, imperfect moment of the Notion and has no truth.’3 However, as 
always, orthodoxy here obscures diversity: while it does remain true that, in almost all of 
Hegel’s output and most of Schelling’s, ‘abstract’ functions perjoratively, this is not the 
whole story. A case in point is Hegel’s Differenzschrift, drafted in Spring 1801, where 
‘abstract’ takes on an ambivalent position.4 On the one hand, there are anticipations of the 
mature Hegel in its critique of Spinozist identity as ‘originating in abstraction’ and of 
‘abstract reasoning [in which] the intellect drifts without an anchor’5; however, on the other 
hand, Hegel takes up a positive idea of abstraction as key to accessing the ‘true identity of 
subject and object’ as the casting off what is ‘peculiar’ and ‘onesided’ in scientific forms.6 
Abstraction generates truth through subtraction. 
 It is with this generative conception of abstraction that the following essay is 
concerned. I begin by sketching its origins in Fichte’s early works, before providing a 
concerted reading of its pivotal role in Schelling’s essay from January 1801, On the True 
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Concept of Philosophy of Nature. Although abstraction only makes this positive appearance 
in a couple of Schelling’s works from a four month period during 18017, it is here worked out 
in a way that crystallises what is innovative and distinctive about Schelling’s philosophy at 
this moment. 
 
 
1. The Characteristics of Generative Abstraction 
To begin, it is necessary to sketch the origins of generative abstraction in Kant and Fichte. 
Abstraction lurks only in the background of Kant’s epistemology. According to the Jäsche 
Logic, it is – along with comparison and reflection – an ‘essential and universal condition for 
the generation of every concept whatsoever.’8 It is on this basis that Osborne has argued that 
Kant gives an ‘unequivocally positive epistemological value to abstraction as constitutive of 
the object of knowledge’: it is through abstraction that experience achieves objectivity.9 
Nevertheless, throughout both the pre-critical and critical periods, the essentially ‘negative’ 
role of abstraction is constantly stressed by Kant, for, while constitutive, abstraction is never 
generative of knowledge; hence, the Blomberg Logic’s assertion, ‘Through abstraction not 
the least cognition arises’10 which is repeated once more in the Jäsche Logic, ‘No concept 
comes to be through abstraction.’11 
 As so often with the Kantian legacy, it fell to Fichte to begin to challenge his refusal 
to countenance generative abstraction. Of all the German Idealists, Fichte employs 
abstraction positively in the most sustained fashion, and it comes to play a significant role not 
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just in his account of epistemology, but at the very heart of his methodology. Beginning in his 
very earliest sketches of the Wissenschaftslehre and culminating in the First Introduction, 
Fichte resorts again and again to abstraction to explain how philosophising is epistemically 
possible. There are, for my purposes, four key components to the Fichtean method of 
abstraction worth picking out. 
 
1.1 Experiments in Transcendence 
As for Hegel in the Differenzschrift, there is a form of abstraction that is generative: it makes 
appear to the philosopher aspects of reality not evident before. This is how Breazeale puts it,  
 
We are no more conscious of our immediate ‘feelings’ than we are of the immediate 
unity of subject and object that is expressed in the Tathandlung… Both of these 
absolute poles of Fichte’s transcendental explanation of subjectivity and of 
experience become objects of thetic consciousness only within philosophical 
reflection, where they are of course abstracted from the full, rich context of lived 
experience.
12
 
 
Only by subtracting from ‘lived experience’ in abstraction does properly philosophical 
content come to consciousness. Moreover, this generative result is, according to Fichte, due 
to the fact that abstraction elevates the philosopher above ordinary experience. Thus, in the 
First Introduction, Fichte writes,  
 
A finite rational being possesses nothing whatsoever beyond experience. The entire 
contents of his thinking are comprised within experience. These same conditions 
necessarily apply to the philosopher, and thus it appears incomprehensible how he 
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could ever succeed in elevating himself above experience. The philosopher, however, 
is able to engage in abstraction. That is to say, by means of a free act of thinking he is 
able to separate things that are connected with each other within experience… and 
when he does so he has abstracted from experience and has thereby succeeded in 
elevating himself above experience. If he abstracts from the thing, then he is left with 
an intellect in itself as the explanatory ground of experience… [This] way of 
proceeding is called idealism.
13
 
 
That is, through abstraction one can ‘raise oneself to a consciousness of an intuition of the 
pure I’.14 The act of rising above ordinary consciousness, of suppressing all objects of 
consciousness, gives one access to an unadulterated intuition of the self-positing I, and from 
this point the Wissenschaftslehre’s construction can begin. 
 This initial act of abstraction is always ‘an experimental enterprise’15, a performance 
that one must undertake for oneself. Such an emphasis on the performativity of 
philosophising is of course a theme running through the whole of Fichte’s works: one cannot 
be given the results of abstraction by another; philosophical thinking must continually begin 
anew with acts of abstraction until this becomes ‘a new habit’16. What is more, for Fichte it is 
the thoroughness and rigour of such an enterprise that provides one of the key criteria for 
philosophical success. As Breazeale puts it, Fichte ‘believed that the purity of the 
philosopher’s inner intuitions and hence the universality of his descriptions is, so to speak, 
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guaranteed by the completeness of the initial act of free abstraction which precedes his series 
of self-observations.’17 Thoroughgoing abstraction provides the warrant for good philosophy. 
 
1.2 Like a Shot from a Pistol 
Therefore, abstraction is the very starting point for philosophy. For example, Part One of the 
Grundlage begins, ‘Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first 
principle of all human knowledge… This makes it necessary to… abstract from everything 
that does not really belong to it.’18 Or, as Fichte programmatically puts it elsewhere, 
 
There is certainly no one among you who does not know that under the name 
Wissenschaftslehre I have labored upon a rigorously scientific transcendental 
philosophy, and that this philosophy is erected upon what remains after one has 
abstracted from everything possible – that is, upon the I. A science of this type can 
furnish no rule except the following: One should continue to abstract from everything 
possible, until something remains from which it is totally impossible to abstract.
19
 
 
Both Fichte and the Schelling of 1801 agree that philosophical method begins in abstraction 
and then proceeds to self-construction. For Fichte, this is a case of abstracting from ordinary 
consciousness to attain the pure self-positing I, before watching it reconstruct reality before 
our eyes: philosophy ‘retraces the path of abstraction, or rather, it permits the I to retrace this 
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path, while it observes this process.’20 The proper philosophical method is: abstract first, then 
construct.
21
 
 Abstraction then is, in fact, a pre-philosophical practice (or one that takes place on the 
cusp of philosophising) necessary to bring about the immediate intuition of the I with which 
philosophy begins. It is a form of mediation that makes immediacy possible.
22
 Abstraction 
thus provides part of an answer to the Hegelian critique of beginning philosophy with 
immediate intuition like a shot from a pistol.
23
 Philosophy may indeed begin like a shot from 
a pistol for both Fichte and the Schelling of 1801, but just as firing such a pistol presupposes 
loading the gun, manufacturing its parts and most significantly learning to shoot, so too 
intellectual intuition is brought about through prior practices, like abstraction.
24
 
 
1.3 The Refusal of Negation 
Abstraction is not negation. One does not actively cancel that from which one abstracts, one 
becomes indifferent to it. ‘The concept… is here not thought of at all – either positively or 
negatively.’25 The abstracted element is not posited in any form. Such a procedure is 
analogous to the phenomenological epochē, as has often been noted26: one brackets the 
natural attitude of ordinary consciousness, so as to attend to and then describe the structures 
of pure self-consciousness. 
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 The importance of this characteristic needs emphasising: since abstraction is not 
negation, a philosophy premised on it possesses (at least) one non-dialectical moment. 
Abstraction cannot be subsumed into a dialectical play of negation and negation of negation, 
for it obeys a different logic. The early philosophies of Fichte and Schelling, premised as they 
are on this initial act of abstraction, offer therefore something different to the hegemony of 
dialectic, concreteness and immanence bequeathed by Hegelian thought – an alternative 
within early German Idealism resistant to the pull of the concrete universal. 
 
1.4 Abstracting from the Objective 
Finally, and it is here that the stakes of Schelling’s divergence from Fichte are most 
obviously to be located, Fichte proposes that one begin philosophising by abstracting from 
the object of intuition to isolate the intuiting activity itself. The philosopher must ‘tear 
himself away from what it given’.27 In other words, for Fichte the abstracting I is a limit, what 
remains after the most thoroughgoing procedure of abstraction has removed every object of 
consciousness. To quote once more, ‘One should continue to abstract from everything 
possible, until something remains from which it is totally impossible to abstract. What 
remains is the pure I.’28 To appropriate the language of the nova method, while one’s thought 
of a wall can easily be bracketed, not so the thought of thinking
29
, and this is because the 
identity of intuiting subject and intuited object, which both Fichte and Schelling agree is the 
presupposition of philosophical knowledge, is for Fichte only made possible by abstracting 
from the object of thought (e.g. the wall) and retaining the pure I. 
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With this Fichtean context in mind, I now turn to Schelling’s 1801 On the True 
Concept of Philosophy of Nature, the most sustained reflection on generative abstraction in 
German Idealism. 
 
 
2. On the True Concept of Philosophy of Nature: Context and Content 
In the Winter of 1800/01 – between the publication of the two great culminating statements 
of Schelling’s 1790s work, the Introduction to the First Outline of a System of Philosophy of 
Nature and the System of Transcendental Idealism, and the dawning of the Identitätssystem in 
May 1801 – Schelling produced a 37-page ‘Zugabe’ on Naturphilosophie. The Appendix to 
Eschenmayer’s Essay concerning the True Concept of Philosophy of Nature and the Correct 
Way of Solving its Problems is a Janus-faced essay that both completes Schelling’s search for 
a distinctive naturphilosophische approach and also announces the possibility of a philosophy 
for which ‘absolute identity is the universe itself’.30 It indeed forms, as Grant has it, ‘as clear 
a manifesto of naturephilosophy as could be wished for’.31 
 The text was published in January 1801 as a supplement to the first issue of the 
second volume of Schelling’s own journal, Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, and it directly 
responds to Eschenmayer’s critique of Schellingian Naturphilosophie which opens that issue, 
Spontaneity = World Soul or the Supreme Principle of Philosophy of Nature. Eschenmayer is 
troubled by the direction in which Schelling’s Naturphilosophie has developed since the first 
edition of the Ideas in 1797, and this is for two reasons.  
 First, prior to the First Outline, Schelling had basically endorsed Eschenmayer’s own 
construction of matter, particularly with respect to the role of quantitative proportions in the 
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determination of qualities.
32
 However, in the First Outline, Schelling breaks with this 
Eschenmayerian account, positing instead qualitatively distinct monads or actants as an 
explanation for the genesis of quality.
33
 In Spontaneity, Eschenmayer vigorously attacks this 
view, and the second half of On the True Concept provides Schelling’s response, in which he 
(implicitly) acknowledges the problems with his own theory in the First Outline
34
 at the same 
time as continuing its critique of Eschenmayer’s quantitative solution. 
 The second motivation for Eschenmayer’s attack is what concerns me in the rest of 
this essay, for it is at this point that methodological issues come to the fore. In Spontaneity, 
Eschenmayer takes up a broadly Fichtean attitude towards Naturphilosophie
35
: the 
fundamental principle of nature is the spontaneity of the subject; nature is derivative of this 
freedom, and thus Naturphilosophie consists in a mere application of the Wissenschaftslehre 
to one local ontic domain.
36
 What alarms Eschenmayer is that the First Outline seems to 
mark a departure from such Fichtean orthodoxy. Hence, his critique is intended as a gentle 
rebuke to a young scholar to bring him back into the Fichtean fold. 
And Schelling responds by openly declaring his break with Fichte. Naturphilosophie, 
he proclaims, is independent of and prior to the Wissenschaftslehre: ‘There is an idealism of 
nature and an idealism of the I. For me, the former is original, the latter is derived.’ (OTC 
88)
37
 This position had first been developed in the closing pages of the Universal Deduction 
of the Dynamic Process
38, and Schelling’s correspondence with Fichte at this time also 
played a decisive role. In November 1800, they exchanged letters on the question of 
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Naturphilosophie’s relation to the Wissenschaftslehre: the violence of Fichte’s refusal to 
countenance any independence for naturphilosophische investigations crystallised for 
Schelling the distance between them.
39
 The result is On the True Concept.
40
 
From the very beginning of the essay, Schelling is clear that a Fichtean interpretation 
of Naturphilosophie is false: 
 
Many people misled by the term ‘philosophy of nature’ expect transcendental 
deductions of natural phenomena... For me, however, philosophy of nature is a self-
sufficient whole and is a science fully differentiated from transcendental philosophy. 
(OTC 85-6) 
 
The radicality of Schelling’s contention here should not go unremarked. It is often thought 
that what unifies the German Idealist tradition, if nothing else, is fidelity to the project of 
transcendental philosophy and an idealist metaphysics. However, Schelling denies that his 
practice of Naturphilosophie can be situated in that tradition; it marks out an alternative, one 
based on rejection of this Kantian heritage. As Grant has put it, ‘Schelling’s post-Kantian 
confrontation with nature itself begins with the overthrow of the Copernican revolution… 
[Schelling precipitated] the fast overthrow of the entire transcendental structure Kant 
bequeathed his philosophical successors.’41 Naturphilosophie is not only liberated from the 
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dead-hand of the Wissenschaftslehre, but from the terms of the Critique of Pure Reason itself, 
in the name of a distinctive experiment in German Idealism.  
 
 
3. The Methodology of Naturphilosophie 
So, if philosophy of nature is no longer strictly speaking a form of transcendental idealism, 
what exactly is it? Schelling realises that his alternative is so distinct from orthodox forms of 
German Idealism that it becomes almost incomprehensible to those accustomed to them: ‘The 
reason that those who have grasped idealism well have not understood philosophy of nature is 
because it is difficult or impossible for them to detach themselves from [the methodology of 
transcendental idealism].’ (OTC 92) The question is therefore to determine the nature of this 
break between the two sciences, and Schelling goes on to specify it as methodological. An 
early passage in On the True Concept sets up this problematic as follows, 
 
If it were just a matter of an idealist type of explanation, or rather construction, then 
this is not to be found in philosophy of nature as I have established it... Why then 
should it not be idealist? And is there in general another type of philosophising than 
the idealist? (OTC 88) 
 
At stake, then, is the nature of this other ‘type of construction’, and, in order to determine this 
methodological difference more precisely, we need to know what exactly is wrong with 
idealist construction. For Schelling in On the True Concept, transcendental idealism remains 
bound by the concerns and structures of the self; it can never transcend these to intuit the 
workings of the natural world (or, more precisely, nature as it does not appear to the self). He 
writes, ‘If I [try] to find out what philosophising itself is, then I see myself merely as 
something known in myself – and during this entire investigation I never get out of myself.’ 
12 
 
(OTC 89) The transcendental idealist remains trapped in ‘the circle of consciousness’ which 
is ‘inescapable’ (OTC 90). The philosopher is both the subject and object of her philosophical 
interest: she is the one philosophising and she is also the one being philosophised about. The 
identity of subject and object in the subject is the genius of Fichtean thought, but also for 
Schelling its inherent limitation: it cannot account for a reality outside of or prior to the 
subject. 
 Evidently, the presupposition that there is such a reality is one that Fichte and, indeed, 
all robust idealists would deny. Schelling has a number of arguments for it. First, it is not 
obvious that the initial self-positing from which reality is to be constructed should be 
identified with the subject, and certainly not a finite or conscious I. Schelling is not denying 
that nature is dependent on – or indeed, identical with – an original self-positing subject-
object; he is merely asserting its independence of – and partial obscurity to – the finite I. 
Within On the True Concept, Schelling expresses the above line of thought as follows, 
 
The following objection [has been] frequently made to me: I presuppose nature 
without asking the critical question of how we thus come to suppose a nature… I 
presuppose nothing for the construction but what the transcendental philosopher 
likewise presupposes. For what I call nature [is] the pure subject-object, what the 
transcendental philosopher posits as = I. (OTC 94) 
 
He continues, 
 
I have therefore not presupposed what you think of as nature, but rather derived it… 
In general, I have presupposed nothing but what can immediately be taken from the 
conditions of knowing itself as a first principle, something originally and 
simultaneously subjective and objective. (OTC 95) 
13 
 
 
What Fichte had labelled ‘the I’, the primordial subject-object which posits itself and from 
which reality as such derives is for Schelling better named ‘nature’. It is the same 
fundamental postulate. 
The above is nevertheless a position not particularly distinctive to Schelling (it is 
shared by many of the more absolute idealists). Instead, the methodological innovations 
behind Schellingian Naturphilosophie emerge when one reframes the above 
epistemologically, in terms of intellectual intuition. What is known must be identical with 
what knows (the identity of subject and object); this premise, shared by Schelling and 
transcendental idealists alike, is the ground of the idea of intellectual intuition. However, on 
first blush, nature (insofar as it remains unperceived or is hidden from consciousness) is non-
identical with the conscious I. How, then, is knowledge of nature, intellectual intuition of 
nature and so the philosophy of nature possible? 
In On the True Concept, Schelling explores two solutions, the Fichtean and his own. 
The Fichtean solution consists in altering (or potentiating) the object (i.e. nature) until it 
becomes identical to the subject: to raise nature into the mind and make it into a sensation or 
perception. Yet, this is in fact not a solution at all, since that which is not raised to the 
potency of consciousness still remains hidden from the philosopher, and for Schelling an 
aspect of reality must necessarily always remain so hidden. That is, reality exists at non-
conscious as well as conscious potencies. Here is how Schelling puts it, ‘[For the Fichtean] I 
can behold nothing objective other than in the moment of its entry into consciousness... and 
no longer in its original coming-into-being at the moment of its first emergence (in non-
conscious activity).’ (OTC 89) The ontology of productive force that Schelling had initially 
developed in the First Outline clarifies this point: nature is productivity-becoming-product, 
and different products are produced at different potencies of productivity; for example, 
14 
 
consciousness, sensation and thought are products of a particular high potency. Schelling’s 
argument is not therefore so much that there are some entities in nature which elude 
conscious perception, but rather that reality itself exists at a multiple of other potencies than 
merely the potency of consciousness. To limit philosophical method merely to the raising of 
reality into consciousness is therefore to foreclose on the study and description of the non-
conscious potencies. Schelling thus writes, through this idealist method, ‘I assume myself 
already in the highest potency, and therefore the question is also only answered for this 
potency.’ (OTC 89) 
The Schellingian solution to this epistemological problem is to proceed in the 
opposite direction: to alter consciousness so that it becomes identical to (and can therefore 
know) non-conscious reality. That is, instead of altering nature and bringing it into identity 
with consciousness, what requires changing is consciousness in order to bring it into equality 
with nature. The philosopher must reduce her intuiting down to the lower potencies, so as to 
become one with the unperceived, hidden natural world: she must become like nature, to 
philosophise from the point of view of nature.
42
 So, for Schelling the question of the 
possibility of Naturphilosophie in fact runs: what need the philosopher do to herself in order 
to become nature and so put into practice genuine Naturphilosophie? And the answer is found 
in abstraction. In On the True Concept, abstraction is the practice that makes 
Naturphilosophie possible: 
 
To see the objective in its first coming-into-being is only possible by depotentiating 
the object of all philosophising, which in the highest potency is = I, and then 
constructing, from the beginning, with this object reduced to the first potency. This is 
only possible through abstraction. (OTC 89) 
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Nature at all of its levels of productivity, not merely the conscious, only becomes visible 
through a process of abstractive depotentiation by which philosophy shifts away from the 
high potencies in which the Wissenschaftslehre had been done and scours the low potencies 
for how nature comes to be. This form of abstraction is that which differentiates 
Naturphilosophie from Wissenschaftslehre: ‘With this abstraction one moves from the realm 
of the Wissenschaftslehre into pure-theoretical philosophy.’ (OTC 89)43 
According to Schelling, this means that, in opposition to Fichte, Naturphilosophie 
begins with abstraction from the subjective (rather than the objective)
44
, i.e. from the 
consciousness of the philosophising subject, so as to access nature as it does not appear to 
consciousness. According to the true concept of Naturphilosophie, philosophy must be taken 
to the potency 0, to its very depths, before gradually reconstructing reality through all its 
potencies, mimicking the productive force of nature. For Schelling as for Fichte, the 
philosopher must abstract and then construct; however, such abstraction will take her in each 
case in a very different direction.  
 
 
4. Förster’s Critique of Schellingian Abstraction 
Schelling’s appeal to abstraction has, however, been recently criticised. In The Twenty-Five 
Years of Philosophy, Eckhart Förster argues from Schelling’s appropriation of the Fichtean 
methodology of ‘abstract first, then construct’ to the ultimate incoherence of 
Naturphilosophie as a distinctive philosophical project. Indeed, Förster goes so far as to base 
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Wissenschaftslehre’ itself (OTC 93). The Wissenschaftslehre thus acts in On the True Concept as something like 
a partial abstraction from which the Naturphilosoph must keep abstracting. See further Dalia Nassar, 
‘Intellectual Intuition and the Philosophy of Nature: An Examination of the Problem’ in Johannes Haag and 
Markus Wild (eds), Übergänge – diskursiv oder intuitive? Essays zu Eckhart Försters ‘Die 25 Jahre der 
Philosophie’ (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2013), pp. 251-2. 
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his entire critique of Schellingian philosophy on the doctrine of abstraction proposed in On 
the True Concept. Förster’s basic thesis throughout the book is that there are two forms of 
immediate cognition at play in German Idealism that scholarship has forever failed to 
distinguish, both originating in the Critique of Judgment: Fichtean intellectual intuition and 
Goethean (or more properly perhaps, Spinozist) intuitive understanding.
45
 And Schelling’s 
philosophy fails, according to Förster, because it employs Fichtean intellectual intuition 
(based on a prior process of abstraction) in Naturphilosophie when only Goethean intuitive 
understanding will do. 
 Therefore, Förster establishes his critique in terms of the Fichtean claim we have 
already encountered above: philosophy – or, what is the same thing, intellectual intuition – is 
premised on the identity of subject and object; but, in knowing nature as something 
unavailable to consciousness, the two are not identical; therefore, there can be no philosophy 
of nature. Here is how Förster puts it, 
 
As Schelling himself writes in the System of Transcendental Idealism—“one always 
remains both the intuited and the one who is intuiting”. This is obviously not so in the 
case of nature: here that which is intuited and the one doing the intuiting are not 
identical. The intellectual intuition adapted from the Wissenschaftslehre is of no use 
in Naturphilosophie.
46
 
 
For Förster, it is with the doctrine of abstraction from On the True Concept that this 
methodological problem becomes most acute for Schelling’s philosophy: 
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 For helpful summaries of the overall argument, see Eckhart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A 
Systematic Reconstruction, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 145, 
152. Nassar, ‘Intellectual Intuition and Philosophy of Nature’, makes the compelling argument that Goethe and 
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If intellectual intuition is to be retained as the method of our intuition of nature, that is 
only possible on the basis of a depotentiation (a suppression or neutralization) of the 
intuiting subject. The question however remains whether an intellectual intuition in 
which one abstracts from the intuiting subject can really amount to more than word- 
play… What exactly would such an intuition be, assuming it possible? [Schelling’s] 
methodology, however, is wholly insufficient. And he is fundamentally mistaken 
when he infers that the method of cognition must be the same for both nature and the 
I, namely intellectual intuition, for he has clearly failed to learn the lesson of what I 
referred to above as Fichte’s central insight: that “I am” and “it is” express two 
wholly distinct modes of being.
47
 
 
Thus, according to Förster, Schelling’s method of abstraction is wholly erroneous, an attempt 
to redeploy Fichtean intellectual intuition within an illegitimate domain. He concludes, 
‘Schelling’s attempt to base the method of his Naturphilosophie on Fichte’s intellectual 
intuition inevitably leads to the dissolution of intellectual intuition.’48 
 Förster’s resolutely Fichtean critique of Schelling is, therefore, ultimately threefold. 
First, when it comes to Naturphilosophie, intellectual intuition is impossible, since in this 
domain subject and object are non-identical. Second, Fichtean intellectual intuition is made 
possible by abstraction from what is objective; therefore, Schelling’s claim that philosophy 
should abstracting from ‘the intuiting subject’ is incoherent (‘mere word-play’) at best, 
impossible at worst. Third, abstraction is ‘insufficient’ in the domain of nature, for this 
method is only valid – as Fichte demonstrated – in relation to the I.49 In what follows, I am 
going to use each of Förster’s criticisms as jumping-off points to try to understand 
Schelling’s conception of abstraction more substantially. 
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 Ibid, p. 375. 
49
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5. Förster’s First Criticism: The Identity of Subject and Object 
I have already shown at length that – programmatically at least – Schelling is committed to 
the identity of subject and object in Naturphilosophie; he is thus committed to the idea that 
abstraction not only does not violate this key epistemic principle, it even makes it possible. 
There are two places in particular we have already encountered this claim. First, in the idea 
that the ‘pure’ subject-object that Fichte labels ‘I’ is in fact nature, and thus 
Naturphilosophie, as nature’s self-construction before the eyes of the philosopher, remains 
subject-object throughout. ‘With nature-philosophy I never emerge from that identity of the 
ideal-real,’ Schelling insists (OTC 92). Second, I have argued that the Schellingian solution to 
the possibility of an intellectual intuition of nature involves the knowing subject altering 
herself so as to become identical with the object of knowledge. Hence, Schelling is clear that 
the tenet that ‘one always remains both the intuited and the one who is intuiting’ so dear to 
the System of Transcendental Idealism remains equally true in Naturphilosophie, pace 
Förster. 
 However, the question of how it is true is still to be determined: I have yet to adduce 
any evidence that it is possible, for example, for the philosopher to alter herself in a way that 
makes her one with nature. It is this task to which I now turn. However, on the face of it, 
Förster has a point, and this is because Schelling describes the process of abstraction in a way 
that makes it seems as if there can be no identity of subject and object through abstraction. 
That is, if what occurs is, as Schelling sometimes describes it, abstraction from the subject, 
then the subjective element of the subject-object seems to have been removed from the remit 
of Naturphilosophie. For example, Schelling writes, ‘If I now abstract from what is first 
posited in the philosopher’s object by this free act, there remains something purely objective’ 
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(OTC 90) or ‘I demand… an abstraction which leaves behind for me the purely objective 
[element] of this [intuiting] act.’ (OTC 92) On this reading, the identity of subject and object 
is not preserved by Schellingian abstraction. 
 However, we need to be careful here; for example, here is this second quotation in a 
fuller form, ‘I demand… an abstraction which leaves behind for me the purely objective 
[element] of this [intuiting] act, which in itself is merely subject-object, but in no way = I.’ 
(OTC 92) That is, there seem to be two notions of subjectivity at stake here: one which is 
removed in the act of abstraction and one which remains part of the subject-object that is left 
behind after abstraction has taken place. In other words, Schelling wants to claim that the 
identity of subject and object in Naturphilosophie is not affected by the abstraction from the 
subjective from which it begins. 
 It is no surprise, then, that Schelling explicitly draws attention to this double meaning 
of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’: 
  
Many philosophical writers... appear to have taken this objective [element], from 
which philosophy of nature should proceed, I don’t quite know for what, but certainly 
for something objective in itself. So, it is no wonder if the confusion in their 
representations proliferates substantially on the back of this… For me… the objective 
is itself simultaneously the real and the ideal; the two are never separate, but exist 
together originally (even in nature). (OTC 91) 
 
There are, then, two senses to the term ‘objective’ at play in On the True Concept, and hence 
two senses of ‘subjective’ as well: what is subjective (or objective) in itself and what is 
commonly called subjective, i.e. what is subjective for consciousness. Schelling here insists 
that these two senses must be kept separate, for while the Naturphilosoph can be said to 
abstract from what is subjective for consciousness, this is no abstraction from what is 
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subjective in itself. The argument for the above can be reconstructed as follows. Common 
consciousness has nature for its object, or put more technically: the subject-object at a 
conscious potency stands as subject opposed to the subject-object at non-conscious potencies 
(its object): ‘From the standpoint of consciousness, nature appears to me as objective and the 
I as subjective.’ (OTC 91) Indeed, the very process by which the subject-object attains a 
higher potency is bound up with this process of self-objectification, ‘the becoming objective 
of the pure subject-object’ as Schelling himself puts it (OTC 91). Hence, to abstract (or 
depotentiate) is to undo this process of self-objectification so as to attain that potency of the 
subject-object at which no subject stands opposed to an object. One reaches a point ‘where 
the opposition between I and nature, which is made in common consciousness, completely 
disappears, so that nature = I and I = nature.’ (OTC 96) This is achieved when the 
philosopher manages to depotentiate to potency 0: at this level, subject and object no longer 
stand opposed, for there is no consciousness to take a stand as subject over against an object. 
It is this aspect of subjectivity (subjectivity for consciousness) that is abstracted in 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, not the subjective in itself.  
When Schelling writes, for example, ‘[Through] abstraction, I reach the concept of 
the pure subject-object (= nature) from which I then rise to the subject-object of 
consciousness (= I)’ (OTC 90), one can clearly see that the task is not to abstract from 
something subjective to reach what is purely objective. Both consciousness (what is 
abstracted from) and nature (what is attained) are subject-objects at different potencies; 
abstraction reduces the potencies, it does not divest subjectivity as such. The point being, to 
return to Förster’s argument, that there remains an identity of subject and object even in non-
conscious nature (and so Schelling’s claim in the Preface to the System of Transcendental 
Idealism holds good in this domain); it is only the opposition between them which is 
bracketed. 
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 Moreover, the above also problematises Förster’s third criticism, which runs: 
abstraction is insufficient to function in the domain of nature, since nature is a realm of the ‘it 
is’, whereas Fichte had already shown that abstraction, and indeed the whole apparatus of 
intellectual intuition, applies merely to the realm of the ‘I am’. As Schelling makes clear 
above, the very idea that the ‘nature’ of Naturphilosophie is something merely objective, 
distinct from and opposed to the subjectivity of consciousness, is false. The beginning of 
Naturphilosophie consists of the abstraction of the higher (or conscious) potencies of the 
subject-object to isolate a depotentiated subject-object (a non-conscious subject-object). So, 
to equate Schellingian nature with something that exists merely as an ‘it is’ of the objective 
world, rather than an ‘I am’ of the subjective self, is an error.50 Nature is subject-object all the 
way down. 
 
 
6. Abstraction and Indifference 
My above account of Schellingian abstraction makes clear something not yet explicitly 
acknowledged by Schelling in On the True Concept – that is, insofar as one abstracts from 
what is subjective for consciousness, one abstracts from what is objective for consciousness 
too. This is for the simple reason that one is abstracting from consciousness as such, and so 
from the structural opposition of subjectivity and objectivity that it establishes. It is not the 
case that Fichtean abstraction can merely remove what is objective, while Schellingian 
abstraction neutralises the subjective; rather, Schelling shows that the true process of 
abstraction – and the only one that is coherent – is one which is shown to neutralise both the 
subjective and the objective insofar as they are qualitatively distinct, so as to bring about a 
‘pure’ subject-object. 
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 Förster’s use of ‘obviously’ (emphasised in the quotation above from p. 239) is particularly inappropriate. 
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 While this reading of abstraction remains merely implicit in On the True Concept 
itself, four months later in the next issue of the Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik Schelling 
returns to the idea of abstraction, and here founds his mature philosophy on an initial 
methodological moment of abstraction from both what is subjective and what is objective. 
The opening proposition of the Presentation of My System of Philosophy reads, 
 
I call reason absolute reason or reason as it is conceived as the total indifference of 
the subjective and the objective… Reason’s thought is foreign to everyone: to 
conceive it as absolute, and thus to come to the standpoint I require, one must abstract 
from what does the thinking. For the one who performs this abstraction reason 
immediately ceases to be something subjective.… [Reason] can of course no longer 
be conceived as something objective either, since an objective something… only 
becomes possible in contrast to a thinking something, from which there is complete 
abstraction here.
51
 
 
Just as in On the True Concept, so too here, abstraction is that method with which the 
philosopher begins. Indeed, this is highly significant: the opening move in that work which 
for the rest of his life Schelling took to be his most fundamental metaphysical statement
52
 
consists in a process of abstraction that neutralises both the subjective and the objective too. 
 Hence, abstraction is to be articulated as an act of depotentiation, where both the 
subject and the object are neutralised so as to isolate what Schelling here calls ‘the total 
indifference of the subjective and the objective’. And it is here we can begin to discern the 
fate of abstraction in Schelling’s post-1801 philosophy: whenever indifference manifests 
itself, whenever nature catastrophically depotentiates back into its abysses and grounds, a 
process that correlates to abstraction is occurring. It is at this moment of depotentiation that 
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23 
 
the work of philosophy always begins, reconstructing nature from its depths. Throughout 
Schelling writings there exists a dialectical oscillation between sporadic yet catastrophic 
moments of ‘abstraction’, followed by a process of continual and gradual potentiation. 
Abstraction in On the True Concept and the 1801 Presentation is the methodological 
repetition of the turba gentium of the Freiheitsschrift, the flood that engulfed Samothrace or 
the unprethinkable crisis of the philosophy of mythology. 
 
 
7. Förster’s Second Criticism: On the Possibility of Schellingian Abstraction 
Just as the transcendental idealist raises himself above the adulterated ‘I’ of ordinary 
experience through an act of abstraction, so too in a mirror image or subversion of the 
idealist, the Naturphilosoph transcends ‘beneath’ the limits of consciousness into the depths 
of nature. Schellingian abstraction performs a kind of transformational enactment of the 
origins of natural becoming.
53
 The methodological opposition that emerges here correlates 
roughly to that which is notoriously described by Deleuze in the Eighteenth Series of The 
Logic of Sense, in which the Fichteo-Platonic philosopher, who is ‘a being of ascents’ acts as 
‘the one who leaves the cave and rises up’54, or as Fichte himself puts it, ‘Just as we were 
ushered by birth into this material world, so philosophy seeks – by means of a total rebirth – 
to usher us into a new and higher world.’55 On the other hand, the Schellingio-Nietzschean 
philosopher ‘placed thought inside the caverns and life in the deep... [and so recognised] the 
absolute depth dug out in bodies and in thought.’56 
 And yet this is a simplification: Schelling does not quite present abstraction in On the 
True Concept as twofold, consisting in either a practical abstraction that ascends or a 
                                                          
53
 I owe this phrase to Kirill Chepurin. 
54
 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (London: Continuum, 1990), p. 145. 
55
 Fichte, ‘The Spirit and the Letter’, p. 203. 
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theoretical one which descends. In fact, he argues that the theoretical abstraction of the 
Naturphilosoph is the only possible form of abstraction. This has become clear in the 
preceding: to abstract is to neutralise forms of consciousness; abstraction is therefore 
subtractive or, in Schellingian terminology, it depotentiates. Thus, to rise to the highest 
potency of pure self-consciousness through abstraction, as Fichte wishes to, is to 
misunderstand the nature of the abstracting process as such, which takes one down the ladder 
of the potencies away from consciousness.
57
 Fichtean abstraction is impossible for this 
reason, and therefore naturphilosophische abstraction is the only genuine form. This is the 
Schellingian rebuttal to Förster’s second criticism.58 
Of course, this does not blunt the full force of Förster’s second criticism entirely; 
there are still ways to present Schellingian abstraction that quickly draw attention to its 
seeming impossibility. For example, according to Schelling, it is through losing 
consciousness that one gains knowledge of the natural world: to philosophise, Schelling 
writes, I had ‘to posit [the I] as non-conscious… not = I.’ (OTC 92) As one deintensifies or 
depotentiates one’s conscious attention, one intensifies one’s knowledge. More is known 
through less – less freedom, less personality, less thinking. Such a presentation of 
Schellingian abstraction seemingly confirms Förster’s second criticism, for how can one 
know without consciousness? How can one philosophise thoughtlessly? That is, how is 
Schellingian abstraction possible? 
 There are a number of ways to frame this objection to Schelling’s doctrine more 
determinately, and I will consider one that particularly worried Schelling below; to begin, 
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however, it is worth constructing it in Fichtean form (especially since Förster’s critique is 
broadly Fichtean in inspiration). For Fichte, one can abstract from everything in experience 
except the act of abstracting itself. Fichte writes, 
 
All that remains after the abstraction has been completed (i.e. after we have 
abstracted from everything we can) is the abstracting subject itself, that is, the I. The 
I is what remains, and it is this for itself.
59
 
 
The activity of the abstracting self forms a limit for abstraction – a limit that Schelling’s 
doctrine entirely transgresses. What is more, Fichte’s implicit argument for such a limit 
seems to be a version of the cogito: just as one cannot doubt that which is doing the doubting, 
so too one can never abstract from what is doing the abstracting. 
 However, the Schellingian response is simple: Schelling is in no sense denying this 
abstracting activity. Abstraction does not have the same limits as doubt, for it is in no way a 
form of rejection, denial or doubt; it is not a modality of negation. I earlier pointed to this 
crucial characteristic of abstraction as elucidated in Fichte’s own writings. Abstraction 
neutralises; it does not negate. To abstract from the positing of the I is not to deny that it 
occurs, it is merely to become theoretically indifferent to it. Therefore, it is perfectly possible 
to abstract from what is self-evidently necessary, like the activity of abstracting itself. There 
is no latent contradiction here, and therefore no limit: to abstract from the subjective is, pace 
Fichte (and also Förster), possible, and it forms the basis of Schelling’s methodology. 
Even granting the above, however, there still remain more problems for the possibility 
of Schellingian abstraction; chief among them: how can one be said to know or be doing 
philosophy while abstracting from consciousness? To think while abstracted from thought 
sounds a fairly tricky, if not downright ridiculous endeavour. 
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 This was a problem to which Schelling returned again and again: the possibility of 
non-conscious philosophy.
60
 And his solution was always to search for models or exemplars 
for this kind of activity. One line of thought leads in this vein from On the True Concept to 
Schelling’s interest in mysticism, particularly Swedenborg and Böhme. Böhme, for instance, 
is constantly plagued, according to Schelling, by an inability to communicate or articulate 
that which is known selflessly. Böhme is thus a ‘philosopher of not-knowing’61 and his 
mystic visions comprise ‘the hatred of clear knowledge.’62 Swedenborg, on the other hand, is 
more successful: he manages to philosophise even while extinguishing the self.
63
 Likewise, 
Schelling’s fascination with occult practices can be read along this trajectory: in Clara 
particularly, Schelling explores the idea of a moment of ‘waking sleep’64 brought about by 
hypnosis through which genuine philosophical insight is possible: ‘Only he who could do 
while awake what he has to do while asleep would be the perfect philosopher.’65 Again, the 
self is temporarily suppressed in the name of knowing the great outdoors; philosophy is 
pursued by means of a loss of consciousness.
66
 
All such experiments are to be understood as means to self-abstract from 
consciousness, and so to philosophise as a not-I. They are specific practices intended to 
induce something like the theoretical abstraction described in On the True Concept; through 
them Naturphilosophie becomes possible. Schelling, then, meets all three of Förster’s 
criticisms, in part at least. In On the True Concept, he provides a model for abstraction that 
remains resolutely anti-Fichtean and yet coherent. 
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